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Abstract. This short paper presents a prototype tool called SANTE (Static ANal-
ysis and TEsting) implementing an original method combining value analysis,
program slicing and structural test generation for verification of C programs.
First, value analysis is called to generate alarms when it can not guarantee the
absence of errors. Then the program is reduced by program slicing. Alarm-
guided test generation is then used to analyze the simplified program(s) in or-
der to confirm or reject alarms.
Keywords: static analysis, program slicing, all-paths test generation, run-time
errors, alarm-guided test generation.
1 Introduction
Software validation remains a crucial part in software development process. Soft-
ware testing accounts for about 50% of the total cost of software development. Auto-
mated software validation is aimed at reducing this cost. The increasing demand on
software validation has motivated much research and two major techniques have
improved in recent years, static and dynamic analysis. They arose from different
communities and evolved along parallel but separate tracks. Traditionally, they were
viewed as separate domains. However, static and dynamic analysis have comple-
mentary strengths and weaknesses and combining them is of significant interest for
program debugging.
This paper presents our tool called SANTE (Static ANalysis and TEsting) combin-
ing value analysis, program slicing and structural testing for the verification of C pro-
grams. In [1], we described an earlier version of the SANTE method combining value
analysis and structural testing for C program debugging. The method used value
analysis to report alarms of possible run-time errors (some of which may be false
alarms), and test generation to confirm or to reject them. The method produced for
each alarm a diagnostic that can be safe for a false alarm, bug for an effective bug
confirmed by some input state, or unknown if it does not know whether this alarm
is an effective error or not. Experimental results showed that the combined method
is better than each technique used independently. It is more precise than a static
analyzer and more efficient in terms of time and number of detected bugs than a
concolic structural testing tool used alone, or even guided by the exhaustive list of
alarms for all potentially threatening statements.
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Fig. 1. SANTE Debugging Process
In the new version of the SANTE tool presented in this paper, we add program slic-
ing to our combination in order to simplify and reduce the source code before test
generation. Program slicing [2] is a technique for decomposing programs based on
data and control-flow information with respect to a given slicing criterion (e.g. one
or several program statements). We present two different usages of program slicing.
First program slicing is performed one time with respect to the set of all alarms. Sec-
ond program slicing is performed n times, once with respect to each alarm (n is the
number of alarms).
Our implementation uses FRAMA-C, a framework for static analysis of C pro-
grams, and PATHCRAWLER, a structural test generation tool. FRAMA-C [3] is being
developed in collaboration betweenCEA LIST and the ProVal project of INRIA Saclay.
Its software architecture is plug-in-oriented and allows fine-grained collaboration of
analysis techniques. Static analyzers are implemented as plug-ins and can collab-
orate with one another to examine a C program. FRAMA-C is distributed as open
source with various plug-ins (i.e. value analysis, dependency analysis, program slic-
ing, weakest precondition, ...). Developed at CEA LIST, PATHCRAWLER [4–6] is a test
generation tool for C functions respecting the all-paths criterion, which requires to
cover all feasible program paths, or the k-path criterion, which restricts the genera-
tion to the paths with at most k consecutive iterations of each loop.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our tool and its implemen-
tation. Section 3 provides some perspectives and concludes.
2 The SANTE tool on a running example
This section demonstrates how, given a C program p and its execution context, the
SANTE tool applies value analysis, program slicing and dynamic analysis for its de-
bugging (see Fig. 1). This process is fully-automatic. The execution context, or pre-
condition, defines value ranges for acceptable inputs of p and relationships between
them. We illustrate each step of the method on the example of Fig. 2a. Given a string
0 int eurocheck ( char * s t r ) {
1 unsigned char sum;
2 char c [ 9 ] [ 3 ]= { "ZQ" , "YP" , "XO" ,
3 "WN" , "VM" , "UL" , "TK" , "SJ " , "RI" } ;
4 unsigned char checksum[12 ] ;
5 int i = 0 , len = 0;
6 i f ( s t r [0]>=97 && s t r [0] <=122)
7 s t r [0]−=32; / / c a p i t a l i z e
8 i f ( s t r [0] < ’ I ’ | | s t r [0] > ’Z ’ )
9 return 2; / / invalid char
10 i f ( s t r len ( s t r ) != 12)
11 return 3; / / wrong length
12 len = st r len ( s t r ) ;
13 checksum[ i ]= s t r [ i ] ;
14 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++){
15 i f ( s t r [ i ]<48 | | s t r [ i ] >57)
16 return 4; / / not a d i g i t
17 checksum[ i ] = s t r [ i ]−48}
18 sum=0;
19 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++)
20 sum+=checksum[ i ] ;
21 while (sum>9)
22 sum=((sum/10)+(sum%10));
23 for ( i =0; i <9; i ++)
24 i f (checksum[0]==c [ i ] [ 0 ] )
25 break ;
26 i f (sum!= i )
27 return 5; / / wrong checksum
28 return 0 ; } / /OK
0 int eurocheck ( char * s t r ) {
1 unsigned char sum;
2 char c [ 9 ] [ 3 ]= { "ZQ" , "YP" , "XO" ,
3 "WN" , "VM" , "UL" , "TK" , "SJ " , "RI" } ;
4 unsigned char checksum[12 ] ;
5 int i = 0 , len = 0;
60 / /@ assert ( \ valid ( s t r + 0 ) ) ;
6 i f ( s t r [0]>=97 && s t r [0] <=122)
7 s t r [0]−=32;
8 i f ( s t r [0] < ’ I ’ | | s t r [0] > ’Z ’ )
9 return 2;
10 i f ( s t r len ( s t r ) != 12)
11 return 3;
12 len = st r len ( s t r ) ;
130 / /@ assert ( \ valid ( s t r+ i ) ) ;
13 checksum[ i ]= s t r [ i ] ;
14 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++){
150 / /@ assert ( \ valid ( s t r+ i ) ) ;
15 i f ( s t r [ i ]<48 | | s t r [ i ] >57)
16 return 4;
170 / /@ assert ( \ valid (checksum+ i ) ) ;
17 checksum[ i ] = s t r [ i ]−48}
18 sum=0;
19 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++)
200 / /@ assert ( \ valid (checksum+ i ) ) ;
20 sum+=checksum[ i ] ;
21 while (sum>9)
22 sum=((sum/10)+(sum%10));
23 for ( i =0; i <9; i ++)
24 i f (checksum[0]==c [ i ] [ 0 ] )
25 break ;
26 i f (sum!= i )
27 return 5;
28 return 0 ; }
a) Function eurocheck b) Function eurocheckwith alarms
Fig. 2. Running example before and after value analysis
str representing the serial number of a euro banknote, this function determines
whether the serial number is valid or not. Such a number normally contains one let-
ter followedby several digits.Wedefine the precondition for the functioneurocheck
as:
str is NULL or a zero-terminated string.
2.1 Step 1: Value analysis
SANTE starts by applying value analysis (see Fig. 1) to eliminate as many potential
threats as possible. When the risk of a run-time error cannot be excluded by the
0 void eurocheck ( char * s t r ) {
5 int i , len ;
60 / /@ assert \ valid ( s t r +0);
6 i f ( s t r [0]>=97 && s t r [0] <=122)
7 s t r [0]−=32;
8 i f ( s t r [0] < ’ I ’ | | s t r [0] > ’Z ’ )
9 return ;
10 i f ( s t r len ( s t r ) != 12)
11 return ;
12 len = st r len ( s t r ) ;
14 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++){
150 / /@ assert \ valid ( s t r+ i ) ;
15 i f ( s t r [ i ]<48 | | s t r [ i ] >57)
16 return ; } }
0 void eurocheck ( char * s t r ) {
5 int i , len ;
61 i f (0 >= length ( s t r ) )
62 error ( ) ;
63 else
6 i f ( s t r [0]>=97 && s t r [0] <=122)
7 s t r [0]−=32;
8 i f ( s t r [0] < ’ I ’ | | s t r [0] > ’Z ’ )
9 return ;
10 i f ( s t r len ( s t r ) != 12)
11 return ;
12 len = st r len ( s t r ) ;
14 for ( i =1; i <len ; i ++){
151 i f ( i >= length ( s t r ) )
152 error ( ) ;
153 else
15 i f ( s t r [ i ]<48 | | s t r [ i ] >57)
16 return ; } }
a) The slice without error branches b) The slice with error branches
Fig. 3. The slice with respect to line 15, before and after adding error branches
(overapproximated) sets of possible values of variables for some statement, value
analysis reports a threat for this statement, that is also called an alarm. In other
words, value analysis proves the absence of errors for some potential threats and
computes a set of alarms reporting the remaining threats. Our implementation uses
the value analysis plug-in of FRAMA-C.
For the program of Fig. 2a, value analysis returns five alarms for (the statements
at) lines 6, 13, 15, 17 and 20. At line 6, we are reading the first character str[0].
This alarm is a bug since str can be empty. At line 13, value analysis reports that
str[i] may be an out-of-bound access. This alarm is a false alarm because if the
length of str is not equal to 12, the program will return wrong length at line 11 and
the execution will never reach line 13. At line 15, the alarm reported is also a false
alarm. Here value analysis does not unroll all iterations, it is configured to unroll the
first two iterations and then it approximates. Same for the alarms at line 17 and line
20.
Technically, the FRAMA-C value analyzer marks each alarm by an annotation
printed just before it using the assert keyword (see Fig. 2b). For instance, at line
15, the overapproximated set of values calculated for i contains values greater than
the length of str and the annotation
/ /@ assert ( \ valid ( s t r+ i ) ) ;
is added just before line 15 (see line 150 in Fig. 2b) to report that the array access
str[i]may be out-of-bound. The reader will find more information on the ACSL
annotation language used by FRAMA-C in [3].
2.2 Step 2: Program slicing
The second step automatically simplifies the programby program slicing. In this tool
demostration, we show three different ways to simplify the program p.
1. The program p is directly analyzed by dynamic analysis without any simplifica-
tion by program slicing. The earlier version of the SANTEmethod presented in [1]
was limited to this unique option. Its main drawback is that dynamic analysis on
a large non-simplified programmay take much time or not terminate, leaving a
lot of alarms unknown.
2. Program slicing is applied once and the slicing criterion is the set of all alarms of
p (formally speaking, the set of threatening statements containing these alarms).
We obtain one simplified program pal l containing the same threats as the orig-
inal program p. Then dynamic analysis is applied to pal l (see Fig. 1). Dynamic
analysis is executed only once and runs faster than for p since it is applied to its
simplified version pal l . For the running example, pal l contains only 18 lines.
3. Let n be the number of alarms in p. Program slicing is performed n times, once
with respect to each alarm ai , producing simplified programs pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Then dynamic analysis is called n times to analyze the n resulting programs pi
(see Fig. 1). The advantage of this option is producing for each alarm ai themini-
mal slice pi preserving the threatening statement of ai . For the running example,
we obtain five slices whose sizes vary from 3 to 16 lines. Fig. 3a shows an example
of a slice for the threat in line 15.
2.3 Step 3: Dynamic analysis
Program slicing is followed by the last step, dynamic analysis, applied to all simpli-
fied programs. Dynamic analysis tries to activate each potential threat, i.e. to cover
execution paths in which the associated alarms are triggered. This step produces for
each alarm a diagnostic: safe, bug or unknown.
In our implementation, we use the PATHCRAWLER tool [5] whose method is sim-
ilar to the concolic testing [7], also called dynamic symbolic execution. Given the C
source code of the function under test, the generator explores program paths in a
depth-first search using symbolic and concrete execution.
Technically, in order to force test generation to activate potential errors on each
feasible program path in p, we add special error branches into the source code of p
in the following way. For each alarm, its threatening statement, say
threatStatement ;
is automatically replaced by the following branching statement:
i f ( errorCondition )
error ( ) ;
else
threatStatement ;
where the condition determines if the error reported by the alarm occurs. For the
running example, the result is shown in Fig. 3b. Test generation is then executed for
the C program with error branches denoted p ′. We call this technique alarm-guided
test generation. If the errror condition is verified in p ′, a run-time error can occur in
p, so the function error() reports the error and stops the execution of the current
test case. If there is no risk of run-time error, the execution continues normally and
p ′ behaves exactly as p. The transformation of p into p ′ adds new branches for error
and error-free states so that PATHCRAWLER algorithm will automatically try to cover
error states. For an alarm a, PATHCRAWLER may confirm it as a bug when it finds an
input state and an error path leading to the bug. PATHCRAWLER may also prove that
the alarm is safe when all-paths test generation on p ′ terminates without activating
the corresponding threat. When all-paths test generation on p ′ does not terminate,
or when incomplete test coverage criterion was used (e.g. k-path), no alarm is clas-
sified safe. Finally, all alarms that are not classified as bug or safe remain unknown.
For the running example, without slicing (cf Sec. 2.2.1), test generation on the
original program with error branches takes around 25 seconds. When the program
is sliced with respect to all alarms (cf Sec. 2.2.2), test generation finishes in around 7
seconds. For each of the five programs sliced with respect to one alarm (cf Sec. 2.2.3),
test generation takes between 1 and 6 seconds. The complete timeneeded for the five
slices is around 13 seconds. The value analysis and slicing steps aremuch faster than
test generation (much less than 1 sec. for this example). In all cases, test generation
concludes that among the five alarms, there is one bug and four false alarms.
3 Conclusion
In this demonstration paper, we presented the SANTE tool combining value analysis,
program slicing and structural testing for C program debugging. The method was
illustrated on a running example. Future work includes proving the soundness of
themethod, studying other ways to combine different analyses and transformations,
and experiments onmore examples.
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